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Domestic Wheat Policy 
Since the dawn of history, civilized man has been concerned with food-
food for current use, for reserves in case of short crop years, for national 
security in case of war, for internal economic and political stability, and 
for adequate supplies for generations yet unborn. 
Joseph and the Egyptians laid the ground work for modern farm policy 
as concerns wheat. Nearly every nation has some form of governmental 
program regulating the production, pricing, and trading of wheat. 
It would perhaps be economically ideal if all nations, regions, and 
areas produced those things for which they had a comparative advantage 
and then freely traded their surpluses for other things they needed and 
wanted. But this is not the case. 
Wheat policy of exporting n a-
tions is different from wheat policy 
of importing countries. Even in the 
U.S. and Canada where the history 
of wheat "problems" has been simi-
lar, there are differing kinds of 
wheat policy and programs. We 
need to examine our own domestic 
and export wheat policies-as well 
as those of other countries in order 
to plan for the future. 
WHEAT POLICY GOALS 
Wheat policy goals of many 
countries-including the U .S.-have 
some things in common including: 
safeguarding people against food 
shortages in war and peace; stabil-
izing food prices and cost of living; 
conserving natural resources; fos-
tering trade relations with other 
nations; contributing to the pros-
perity and growth of the national 
economy; and maximizing price 
and income for wheat farmers con-
sistent with acceptable public costs. 
In addition we need to ask our-
selves, in evaluating wheat policy 
proposals, questions such as: 
Will it leave an acceptable num-
ber of managerial decisions to the 
wheat farmer? 
Will effective competition be 
maintained within the wheat indus-
try in a manner which will con-
tinue to stimulate technological 
improvement? 
Will the public welfare be safe-
guarded against monopolistic re-
strictions and special advantages 
granted to one segment of agricul-
ture or society? 
Will it materially contribute to 
"income equality for agriculture" 
-income (particularly t h a t of 
wheat farmers in this case) consist-
ent with the income of non-farm 
people having similar abilities, 
training, and other resources? 
·within the wheat industry itself, 
will it create special benefi ts for 
some at the expense of others? 
Does it lend itself to feasible 
administra tion? 
Will the benefits accrue to farm 
operators or be capitalized into 
land values? 
What will be the effects on rural 
towns and communities and their 
business and social institutions? 
EXTENSION SERVI CE 
vVhat effect will it have on mar-
keting practices and institutions in 
domestic and foreign trade? 
Will it adapt itself to economic 
production adjustments among 
farms and regions? 
Different people will have differ-
ent answers to these and other 
questions and will have varying 
degrees of acceptance of any policy 
which may be offered. Hence, we 
may expect wheat policy-and any 
other policy-to be a compromise 
of that which is most acceptable 
and least objectionable. Historical 
perspective and political reality 
suggest that progress is made slowly, 
painfully, and a little at a time. 
EARLY U. S. WHEAT POLICY 
PROGRAMS 
U.S. agricultural policy had its 
beginning more than a century ago. 
From the Hamilton-] efferson de-
bates came our nation's declaration 
for a public lands distribution pol-
icy and programs fostering a sys-
tem of family farming. 
For more than 100 years this 
country has supported, through 
state and federal aid, the policies 
contributing to our present level 
of productive ability. Establishment 
of the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture, the Land Grant University 
system (with its experiment stations 
and extension service operations), 
and other institutional develop-
ments all have contributed to a 
progressive agriculture. 
Until about 1920 our policy was 
beneficial to wheat farmers, to the 
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nat~onal economy and to trading 
natwns. Then came a time when 
agriculture's capacity to produce 
more wheat caught up with and 
passed the market demand for 
wheat at acceptable prices to U.S. 
producers. A new era in wheat pol-
Icy and programs within the broad 
scope of total agricultural policy 
was born. 
From 1909 to 1920 wheat pro-
ducers (and farmers generally) had 
relatively favorable incomes. \.V orld 
War I touched off a demand for 
wheat which outstripped capacity 
to .produce. Prices rose rapidly. 
Neighbors competed with each 
other for more land, mortgaging 
what they owned to obtain new 
lands at inflated wartime prices. 
The bubble burst in the early 
'20s. v\T e were suddenly short on 
markets and long on supplies of 
wheat. Prices fell rapidly. Banks 
f~iled. For wheat farmers, espe-
Cially, the first shock wave of the 
great depression to follow struck 
late in 1920. The great crash of 
1929 brought total business depres-
sion to this country and to the 
\.V estern world. 
McNary-Haugen Movement 
of the '20s 
~uch that was to develop in 
pohcy for wheat during the next 40 
years started in the early '20s. Farm 
leaders turned to the government 
for help in bringing about wheat 
production adjustments consistent 
with economic demands of the mar-
ket, more orderly marketing of 
wheat, and improved returns to 
wheat producers. 
Many of the features of the "pro-
posed Wheat Program for 1964" 
were considered in the McNary-
Haugen Acts of the '20s. Similar 
features included a plan for a two-
price system for wheat in the do-
~estic and export markets (includ-
mg use of what was recently known 
as the "wheat certificate system"), 
and the encouragement of volun-
tary wheat supply-management. 
Backed by the politically potent 
"farm bloc," the McNary-Haugen 
Act was twice passed by Congress, 
but was vetoed by President 
Coolidge both times. 
GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 
Beginning with the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1929, U.S. agri-
~ultural policy has been expressed 
m a senes of laws dealing with 
problems of resource use and con-
servation, marketing, credit, and 
related problems. The central focus 
?f policy has been that of improv-
mg farm prices and income. 
Parity (the rewards ratio for re-
sources used by agriculture in 
1909-191-! in relation to resources 
used elsewhere in the nation's econ-
omy) has been the symbol of econo-
mic equality. For practical pur-
poses, ~5 to 90 percent of parity has 
symbohzed economic security for 
wheat farmers. Because of their 
price or income focus, past agri-
cultural programs have not ade-
quate!~ dealt. with needed adjust-
ments m the s1ze of the agricultural 
labor force, in the amount of other 
resources, in the size of farm units 
and in land use changes. ' 
The Federal Farm Board, 
Born to Trouble 
The first large scale price-support 
program developed in the U.S. was 
under the Agricultural Marketing 
Act of 1929. That Act established a 
Fede~al Farm Board "to promote 
effectiVe merchandising of agricul-
tural commodities-so that the in-
dustry of ~griculture will be placed 
o~ a basis of economic equality 
With other industry." It was as-
sumed _that "effective and orderly" 
mar~etmg would bring about price 
and mcome equality. No provisions 
were made for price supports. 
The Federal Farm Board was 
instructed to promote, finance, and 
work_ ~ith cooperative marketing 
asso_oat10ns and to investigate and 
advi~e as to prevention of overpro-
ductiOn, removal of submarginal 
land from cultivation, expansion of 
markets at home and abroad, and 
research and discovery of new uses 
for farm products. 
The Board was given a revolving 
~und of $500 million to carry out 
Its purposes .. Its work was mainly 
through natwnal organizations of 
marketing cooperatives on the as-
sumption that through them farm-
ers could sell their products in a 
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much more orderly fashion, with-
holding wheat when prices were 
lo'." and .releasing it gradually when 
pnces picked up again. 
The cooperatives were expected 
to persuade farmers to control 
~heir production and prevent ser-
wus surpluses from arising. Vain 
hope! Farmers did not reduce out-
put. As individuals they couldn't 
afford to do so. Neither the Board 
nor the cooperati-ves had sanctions 
they could use to effectively adjust 
wheat production. Wheat surpluses 
mounted. The Board made loans to 
cooperatives to keep wheat off the 
ma~ket and thus, hopefully, to 
av01d further price declines. 
A bumper wheat crop in 1929 
added to the already large wheat 
carryover. In the meantime a 
world-wide economic depres~ion 
had begun. 
The Board plunged into buying 
wheat already held by cooperatives 
and into buying up new wheat. 
Th_e Boar~ had authority to dispose 
?fIts holdmgs according to its own 
JUdgment. The private wheat trade 
could never be quite sure what the 
Board might do about selling stocks 
-~ factor serving to dampen the 
pnce supporting measures em-
ployed by the Board. By April, 
1931, the Board's wheat holdings 
exceeded 200 million bushels. Open 
market wheat prices were down 
drastically. The Board's money was 
about gone. For practical purposes 
the program was finished. ' 
Hindsight indicates t h a t the 
\Farm Board was born to die-
bt;cause it coincided with world-
Wide depression and colossal wheat 
output at home and abroad. But it 
taught man~ people something of 
the compleXIty of the economics of 
s~orage. Many had not fully rea-
lized that there were good chances 
for heavy losses with little to gain 
fr~m. trying to use storage as the 
prmCipal . solution to price and 
mc~me distribution problems in 
agnculture. 
On the plus side, it was observed 
that wheat prices could have been 
30 to 40 cents per bushel lower in 
the Great Plains during 1930 with-
out the Farm Board's effort. If 
world economic recovery had begun 
before the Board ran out of money 
there is reason to believe that the 
"experiment" might have been 
something of a success. Instead, the 
Board was expected to fight off a 
deep and prolonged depression 
with emergency measures inade-
quate for the size of the task. 
Was the Farm Board program 
effort a complete failure? 
Did its experiences contribute 
usefully to the development of pol-
icy which followed? 
Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933 
In contrast to the Agricultural 
Marketing Act of 1929, the Agricul-
tural Adjustment Act of 1933 
(AAA) was specific in its objec-
tives as well as in measures to be 
taken. Its objectives included the 
establishment of such balance 
between production and consump-
tion as would restore purchasing 
power for wheat, and other agricul-
tural commodities involved, to 
their 1909-1914 level. 
In this act is found our first legis-
lative definition of a "price support 
norm" (or price parity) and a decla-
ration by Congress of its policy to 
reestablish parity prices as rapidly 
as feasible, together with a declara-
tion of intent not to unduly disad-
vantage the purchasing power of 
consumers. 
In its early operations commo-
dity loans were not stressed. But 
shortly following passage of the 
Act, pressure for immediate and 
effective price support became so 
great that a Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC) was created by 
executive order to make non-re-
course loans to farmers. 
Non-recourse commodity loans 
are, in effect, government purchase 
contracts in which the farmer re-
tains title or an option to buy back 
within a stated period by repaying 
the loan. Thus the farmer may take 
advantage of any price rise from 
date of loan until it is called or give 
the government title to the product 
in return for money advanced him. 
The "loan rate" becomes a "price 
support Hoor" for the commodity. 
In contrast to Federal Farm 
Board operations, commodity loans 
made to farmers under AAA (by 
CCC) depended upon farmer parti-
cipation in a production control or 
adjustment program. 
During the first year of AAA 
( 1933-34) wheat farmers were given 
"base acreages" of wheat and "a 
normal yield" for each farm as a 
guide for production adjustments 
asked of them later should they 
elect to participate in wheat pro-
duction adjustment programs. In 
return for reducing wheat acreage 
or marketings below base allot-
ments, farmers were to receive var-
ious kinds of benefit payments or 
price guarantees. 
D u r i n g 1933-35 "processing 
taxes" were levied against various 
commodities. Proceeds were to be 
used in making benefit payments to 
farmers participating in productio11 
control programs. These benefit 
payments represented the first use 
of direct payments by government 
for agriculture. The 1933 Act pro-
vided that the processing tax would 
be at a rate equaling the difference 
between the current average farm 
price for the commodity and the 
"fair exchange value of the com-
modity." 
In 1936 the Supreme Court de-
clared processing taxes for produc-
tion control purposes unconstitu-
tional. 
Soil Conservation & Domestic 
Allotment Act of 1936 
Following the Supreme Court's 
decision against the processing tax, 
Congress quickly passed the Soil 
Conservation and Domestic Allot-
ment Act of 1936. The Act of 1933 
had concentrated upon curtailing 
production, reducing surpluses, and 
raising prices. The new Act of 1936 
encouraged farmers to change pro-
duction away from wheat and other 
surplus crops and into commodities 
not in surplus. Payments or bene-
fits to wheat farmers and produc-
tion adjustment were based on ade-
quately providing for consumption 
needs of people at home and 
abroad, and soil conservation needs 
in the national interest. The pro-
gram was financed by direct appro-
priations. 
The idea of "soil conservation" 
was emphasized as a means of pro-
duction control to recognize the 
national concern that public mon-
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ies be spent to encourage improved 
resource use and conservation as 
well as contributing to better price 
and income positions. for farmers. 
It has been said that conservation 
was employed as the "gimmick" to 
obtain public support for using 
government money to enhance the 
economic position of farmers. 
Be that as it may, farmers <lid 
<liven potentiai wheat lands to 
grass and hay in return for the 
benefits made available to them 
under the 1936 Act. They also 
made use of continually improving 
technology and over the years 
increased yields and total produc-
tion while reducing acreage. 
In 1938, dairymen became 
alarmed over the probable impact 
of more grasslands and forage. 1 t 
was easy to see that land diverted to 
forage production might eventually 
mean stepped-up dairy production. 
Congress passed an amendment to 
the 1936 Act which granted benefit 
payments to grain farmers only on 
the condition that diverted acres 
not be used to produce dairy prod-
ucts for market. 
Under circumstances extstlng 
today what are the relative merits 
of wheat land diversion as com-
pared to wheat land retirement? 
Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1938 
After two years of operation 
under the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act of 1936, a 
new pattern of farm price support 
was set up by the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1938. That pat-
tern was to be generally followed 
into the early 1960's (with modi-
fications during World War II). 
Under the Act of 1938, price sup. 
ports were made mandatory rather 
than discretionary. The law re-
quired the AAA to support prices 
o£ wheat at not less than 52 percent 
nor more than 75 percent of parity. 
To control supply and adjust it 
to expected market demands, use of 
acreage allotments was provided. 
Price supports and other income 
supplements were dependent upon 
complying with wheat acreage allot-
ments. In addition, penalties were 
applied to all producers who over-
planted their wheat acreage allot-
ments. 
The legislation greatly expanded 
CCC's loan and storage program. 
Liquidation of CCC storage hold-
ings at a cost-plus figure was auth-
orized. This was not possible until 
World \1\Tar II created a demand 
for our accumulated stocks. 
Appraisal of AAA effectiveness 
from 1933 through 1940 indicates 
that it did contribute to better 
prices and incomes for wheat grow-
ers. Many of the diverted wheat 
acres were transferred into produc-
tion of other crops which in turn 
began to create supply and demand 
·imbalances for those commodities. 
Actual wheat output was not re-
duced because higher and guaran-
teed prices encouraged rapid adop-
tion of new wheat production tech-
nology. Large stocks of wheat, corn 
and cotton were acquired by CCC 
from 1937 to 1941. 
Wartime Programs for Wheat 
In May, 1941, Congress raised the 
wheat loan rate to 85 percent of 
parity. At that time wheat prices 
in the Great Plains were approxi-
mately 70 percent of parity. The 
Act was intended as a production 
incentive to wheat growers to meet 
wartime needs for wheat. In 1942, 
Congress passed the Stabilization 
Act providing that no price ceilings 
on farm products be set below 110 
percent of parity. A further provi-
sion was that prices were to be sup-
ported at 90 percent of parity for 
2 years following the end of the 
war. 
Administrative regulations pre-
vented the imposition of price ceil-
ings on farm products without the 
approval of the Secretary of Agri-
culture. This was tantamount to 
"no ceilings for wheat" inasmuch 
as the Secretary ruled that ceilings 
could not apply to prices of farm 
products at the farm or local mar-
ket, but could be applied to pro-
cessed farm products. Farm prices 
were generally held in line with 
consumer purchasing power by the 
Office of Price Administration. 
All limits on wheat acreages and 
production were lifted in 1943. 
With high support prices, new tech-
nology, favorable production 
weather and insurance against 
price and income cutback for a 
2-year period following war's end, 
the Great Plains wheat farmer 
planted and harvested all-time rec-
ord crops. 
Post-War Dilemmas 
Farmers had done a tremendous 
war-time job of producing wheat 
despite problems in obtaining 
needed equipment, labor, etc. Per 
capita farm incomes were rising 
rapidly. Farmers looked upon this 
as a justifiable catching up from 
their past economic position. 
At the end of World War II, gov-
ernment faced the dilemma of try-
ing to keep its policy of stimulating 
agricultural production in line 
with its policy of checking infla-
tion. In May, 1943, Congress pro-
vided for payment of subsidies to 
processors and distributors of cer-
tain important cost-of-living items 
including wheat. In this latter cate-
gory, subsidies of one cent per loaf 
of bread were started to reconcile 
the policy of food a-plenty at fair 
prices with the policy of providing 
the wheat producer with price and 
income parity. 
Farm spokesmen generally dis-
liked and fought against subsidies 
of this kind, arguing that employ-
ment and wage levels were already 
high enough to offset high prices 
of food. They generally ignored the 
possibility that further rises in farm 
prices might have caused labor to 
press for higher wages - which 
would have been followed by rising 
industrial prices and still higher 
costs of production inputs for agri-
culture. 
Farm prices for wheat h eld high 
until 1949. CCC stocks of wheat 
began to accumulate again as ex-
ports declined with postwar recov-
ery abroad. 
Agricultural Acts of 
1948 and 1949 
Before high level wartime price 
supports ended, Congress con-
cerned itself with peacetime legisla-
tion. The 1948 Act returned to the 
principle of flexible price support. 
It provided that support levels be 
lowered whenever supplies were 
above normal consumption require-
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ments (60 percent of parity if the 
crop were 130 percent of normal, 
or supports at 90 percent of parity 
in event supplies or cr"op output 
went to 70 percent of normal) . 
The 1948 Act also took a step in 
the direction of modernizing the 
parity formula by adjusting price 
rela tionships between different 
farm products on the basis of the 
most recent 10-year period. The 
60-90 percent of parity support pro-
visions referred to in the Act were 
postponed until 1950. This left the 
principles of flexibility recognized 
but high, rigid price supports still 
in effect. 
The 1948 Act was not well re-
ceived. Farmers liked the prices 
they had received for several years 
and were fearful of their economic 
future if support levels were low-
ered. Their spokesmen pressed hard 
for a change. 
The Agricultural Act of 1949 
retained the principle of flexible 
price supports but with many quali-
fications . A price support -range of 
75 to 90 percent of parity was 
adopted. 
Policy Since 1949 
Several legislative acts passed 
between 1949 and 1962 provided a 
formula for computing the price 
support level between 7 5 and 90 
percent of parity, depending on 
the relationship of total supplies to 
normal requirements. In view of 
the large surplus, support rates 
would have been at the minimum 
of 75 percent of parity-except that 
the Korean conflict and war-related 
legislation kept the formula from 
becoming effective during several 
years in the early 1950's. 
Acreage allotments were again 
established for wheat in 1950, but 
during the Korean conflict acreage 
restrictions were dropped. For crops 
of 1955 and 1956, support was 
above 75 percent of parity under 
special legislation. The minimum 
support level was determined and 
announced prior to producer refer-
endums. It was recomputed at the 
beginning of the marketing year 
(July I) and increased if required 
by a change in the total supply or 
in the parity price. In no case was 
it lowered. 
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Price support continu ed to be 
extended t h r o u g h n on-recourse 
loans and purchase agreements to 
producers who complied with their 
acreage allotment. In 1953, 1954, 
and 1958. more than 40 percent of 
the total wheat crop was placed 
under price support, with much of 
it reverting to CCC. For the 1963 
crop, a diversion payment was 
offered producers who voluntarily 
retired a portion of their wheat 
allotment to conservation uses. 
Acreage allotments for wheat 
have been in effect each year since 
1954. Although a n ational acreage 
allotment has been computed each 
year under a formula in the law, 
the allotment-by law-could not 
be less than 55 million acres. When-
ever the estimated total supply ex-
ceeded estimated requirements by 
over 20 percent, a referendum was 
called to determine whether mar-
keting quotas would be imposed. 
If favored by at least two-thirds 
of the producers voting, market-
ing quotas were in effect with a 
sizable cash penalty for overplant-
ing (growers with under 15 acres 
exempted). If rejected by produc-
ers, the quota provisions are sus-
pended, but price support is pro-
vided for producers who comply 
with their acreage allotment. 
The minimum national allot-
ment of 55 million acres may have 
been appropriate in the late 1930's 
when wheat yields averaged 15 to 
16 bushels per acre. But now- with 
national average yields of about 25 
bushels per acre-a crop from 55 
million acres almost surely results 
in surplus production. The 15-acre 
exemptions also added to the wheat 
surplus. 
Recognition that the wheat pro-
gram was not effective led to a 
temporary effort to reduce wheat 
production in the mid-1950's by 
retiring acres under the Soil Bank 
program (Acreage Reserve and Con-
servation Reserve). Government 
owned stocks of wheat were reduced 
in 1957 and 1958, and wheat pro-
duction-though excessive-was less 
than it might have been if it were 
not for the Soil Bank. The acreage 
reserve phase ended with the 1958 
crop year. In 1958-59 wheat stocks 
rose 414 million bushels; by 1961, 
stocks had reached 1,4 11 million 
bushels. Congress authorized tem-
porary wheat stabilization programs 
for 1962 and 1963. 
In 1962, acreage allotments on 
individual farms were reduced by 
lO percent from their allotments 
based on 55 million acres. By de-
voting the diverted acres to ap-
proved soil conserving uses, grow-
ers earned land diversion payments. 
They could also earn additional 
payments by voluntarily diverting 
more wheat acres to conserving 
uses. The penalty r ate for exceed-
ing the farm acreage allotment was 
also increased. 
For the 1963 crop, legislation 
provided a voluntary land diversion 
program similar to 1962, but the 
lO percent mandatory diversion 
was dropped. 
WHAT NOW? 
The Agricultural Act of 1962 
revised the wheat program for 1964 
and later years. The 55 million acre 
minimum acreage allotment was re-
pealed. Wheat farmers were, in 
effect, told by Congress that they 
could no longer expect price sup-
ports at near parity level without 
effective production controls. 
As before, growers could decide 
by referendum w h e t h e r they 
wanted this type of program or 
lower support prices and less re-
strictions on production. A "yes" 
vote would have meant stricter 
controls over production and mar-
keting. Opponents of this program 
warned against increasing control 
over farm production and market-
ing. Less than half of those voting 
in the May, 1963 referendum voted 
"yes." 
The defeat of the two-price, di-
version program left the wheat 
situation "up in the air." The 1964 
wheat crop will not be produced 
and sold in a completely free mar-
ket. Existing legislation remains in 
effect until changed by Congress. 
Growers who comply with acreage 
allotments will be eligible for price 
support at 50 percent of parity. 
Those who over-plant allotments 
will lose acreage history for future 
programs but will not be subject to 
marketing quota penalties. 
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At the time of this writing (Sep-
tember, 1963) the future of govern-
ment wheat policy was uncertain. 
Congress appeared to be in no 
mood to pass new legislation. Farm-
ers were not pressing actively for 
a new program. One thing was 
clear: wheat policy-and probably 
agricultural policy in general-was 
at a crucial point. 
The Wheat Growers Dilemma 
Farmers and other policy makers 
recognize that the wheat problem 
h as not been solved with past wheat 
programs. With public costs high 
and the " third market" (CCC) sat-
urated with wheat, it is obvious 
that 1 e s s wheat production is 
needed. But cutting output of 
wheat in the Great Plains is dif-
ficult for farmers because ( l) 
equally profitable alternative crops 
may not be available, and (2) sup-
port prices for wheat have been 
capitalized into land values, mean-
ing that someone stands to lose, 
from reduced wheat acreages, out-
put, and possibly lower prices. 
Farmers are aware of the inequi-
ties that have arisen under admin-
istered wheat programs. These 
include differences in rights to 
plant or sell wheat as they have 
arisen between farms, between 
areas of a state and between r e-
gions. The historical wheat base 
seems unfair to many farmers and 
contributes to mounting resistance 
to governmental programs. In addi-
tion, many producers in the rna jor 
wheat areas are discontented with 
the producing and voting rights of 
the "15-acre producers." 
Less publicized, but of increasing 
concern to the Great Plains wheat 
farmer, is a growing awareness of 
diminishing political influence. He 
recognizes that the increasing num-
ber of urban congressmen are likely 
to be less concerned than their col-
leagues from farm states over devel-
oping policy acceptable to wheat 
producers. 
Policy makers for wheat are faced 
with these facts: 
(1) Wheat production capacity is 
still expanding with yields now a 
third higher than 10 years ago, and 
trending higher. 
(2) Barring war or crop failure 
in other countries, probability of 
shon run expansion in the demand 
for wheat at home or abroad is 
remote. 
(3) Program choices for wheat re-
quire compromise of conflicting 
interests, goals, and values within 
the economy. 
Wishing these weren't so will 
not make them go away. 
REFERENCES 
1. Manning, T. W. and Doll, 
R. J., The Wheat Adjustment 
Problem, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Kansas City, November, 1961. 
2. Schnittker, John A., Wheat 
Problems a n d Programs in the 
United States, Research Bulletin 
753, University of Missouri, Colum-
bia, September, 1960. 
3 . ... .... ...... ...... ... .. .... , Wheat Facts, 
PA-551, Agricultural Stabilization 
and Conservation Service, U.S.D.A., 
Washington, D.C., January, 1963. 
4. Halcrow, H. G., Agricultural 
Policy of the United States, Pren-
tice-Hall, New York, 1953. 
t.i 
Why did fanners reject the pro-
posed program in the 1963 referen-
dum? 
Did they reject the degree of 
government control over supply 
management and demand expan-
sion rather than the basic prin-
ciples involved? 
What lessons can be applied to 
future farm legislation and pro-
gram administration? 
T his publica tion is one of five in 
a series, "Wheat, People, a nd the 
Plains" prepared by the following 
Agricultural Economists from the 
Land Grant Colleges or Universities 
of the Great Plains States: R aymond 
C. Stack, Colorado; Robert J . 
Bevins, Kansas; William Ewasiuk, 
Montana; Everett E. Peterson, Ne-
braska; Norbert A. Dorow, and 
H . W . Herbison, North Dakota; 
James R . Enix, Oklahoma; Thomas 
D. Aaron, Texas; Earl Moncur, 
Wyoming. E. Dean Vaughan served 
as chairman of the group while an 
economist at Montana State College 
and continued as a consultant after 
joining the staff of the Federal 
Extension Service, USDA. S. Avery 
Bice, associate director , Colorado, 
served as administrative advisor. 
Donald W. Dickson, information 
specialist, FES, was editorial consul -
tant to the committee. 
